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Abstract—Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) have been ap-
plied to a broad range of applications including natural language
processing, drug discovery, and video recognition. However, their
vulnerability to input perturbation is also exposed. Aligning
with a view from software defect detection, this paper aims to
develop a coverage guided testing approach to systematically
exploit the internal behaviour of RNNs, with high possibility
of detecting defects. Technically, the long short term memory
network (LSTM), a major class of RNN, is thoroughly studied.
A family of three test metrics are designed to quantify not
only the values but also the temporal relations (including both
step-wise and bounded-length) exhibited when LSTM processing
inputs. A genetic algorithm is applied to efficiently generate
test cases. Based on these, we develop a tool TESTRNN, and
extensively evaluate TESTRNN on a set of LSTM benchmarks.
Experiments confirm that TESTRNN has several advantages over
the state-of-art tool DeepStellar and attack-based defect detection
methods, owing to its working with finer temporal semantics
and the consideration of the naturalness of input perturbation.
Furthermore, TESTRNN enables meaningful information to be
collected and exhibited for users to understand the testing results,
which is an important step towards interpretable neural network
testing.
Index Terms—RNNs, coverage guided testing, coverage met-
rics, test case generation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Feedforward neural networks (FNNs), notably convolutional
neural networks (CNNs), are vulnerable in various safety and
security scenarios, subject to adversarial attack [42], backdoor
attack [17], data poisoning attack [36], privacy issues [37],
etc. These defects are extensible to recurrent neural networks
(RNNs). In this paper, we study the RNN defects, focusing
on adversarial samples [1] and backdoor samples [10]. These
defects will lead a well-trained RNN to mis-predictions. Dif-
ferent from CNNs, RNNs exhibit particular challenges, due
to their more complex internal structures and their processing
of sequential inputs with a temporal semantics, supported by
their internal memory components.
A generic RNN layer takes as input a sequential sample x,
updates its internal state c, and generates an output h. Other
structural components may be required for specific RNNs.
Given an input {xt}nt=1, the RNN layer will be unfolded with
respect to the size n of the input, and therefore each structural
component has a corresponding sequence of representations,
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for example {ht}nt=1. Such a sequence of representations form
a temporal evolution.
Coverage-guided testing has achieved a great success in
software defect detection, and has been extended to work with
FNNs in e.g., [32], [48], [25], [39], [40], where a collection
of FNN coverage metrics can be found. The definitions of
these metrics are based on the structural information, such
as the neurons’ activations [32], [25], the relation between
neurons in neighboring layers [39], [40], etc. While existing
coverage metrics for FNNs may be adapted to work with
RNNs, they are insufficient because they do not work with the
internal structures of RNNs and, more importantly, the most
essential ingredient of RNNs – the temporal relation – is not
considered. Moreover, we note that, a few coverage metrics
are proposed in [12] for RNNs, by making simple extensions
to those of FNNs without considering the temporal relation
and the internal structures (e.g., the important components
of RNNs such as gates). This paper is to develop dedicated
coverage metrics for RNNs, to take into account the additional
structures and temporal semantics.
As suggested in [23], [11], a test metric does not have
to be strongly related to adversarial samples, a specific type
of defects corresponding to the robustness requirement of
a neural network. This is not surprising, and actually not
new (for software testing). As stated in [5], a (software)
program with high test coverage has more of its source
code executed during testing, which suggests it has a lower
chance of containing undetected software defects compared to
a program with low test coverage. We concur with this view,
and suggest that, instead of identifying a particular type of
defects such as adversarial samples, coverage-guided testing
is to generate a set of test cases as diversified as possible while
preserving the naturalness, in order to exploit the internal
behaviour of the neural networks that has real operational
impact. The proposed coverage metrics in this paper are
of such desirable features of being diverse and natural –
with increased coverage, our approach is more likely to find
different types of faulty behaviours (e.g., adversarial samples
and backdoor samples) that manifest at multiple small regions
in the input space (rather than adversarial samples clustered
in one region as what normally attack-based methods find).
Especially when the operational profile is unknown or chang-
ing, such diversified test cases are of particular importance for
improving the delivered reliability [4] (indeed, spending all the
budget on testing one input region that potentially has limited
chance to be operated in practice is unwise). Meanwhile, our
diversified test cases are “closer” to their seeds (points on the
RNN’s data manifold), compared to other state-of-the-art tools,
implying higher chance to be seen in the real-life operation,
thus preserving the naturalness.
a) Contributions: We first discuss in Section III why the
coverage-guided testing is useful in analysing RNNs and how
to reasonably define the effectiveness of a testing framework.
We focus on long short-term memory networks (LSTMs),
which is the most important class of RNNs, and design three
LSTM structural coverage metrics, namely boundary coverage
(BC), step-wise coverage (SC) and temporal coverage (TC).
Simply speaking, TC quantifies the multi-step temporal re-
lation, which describes the internal behaviour on how LSTM
cell processing inputs, while BC and SC quantify the value and
single-step change of the temporal relation, respectively. We
also discussed in Section V how to position the new metrics
against a few closely related techniques such as complete
verification techniques, existing metrics, etc.
We implement the proposed coverage metrics into a pro-
totype tool TESTRNN1, which includes two algorithms –
a random mutation and a genetic algorithm based targeted
mutation – for test case generation. In particular, targeted
mutation uses the coverage knowledge to guide the test case
generation. Initially, a random mutation is taken to generate
test cases. Once the un-targeted randomisation has been hard to
improve the coverage rate, a targeted mutation by considering
the distance to the satisfaction of un-fulfilled test conditions
is taken to generate corner test cases.
We conduct an extensive set of experiments over a
wide range of LSTM benchmarks to confirm the utility of
TESTRNN and the proposed coverage-guided RNN testing
approach from the following aspects:
1) diversity of generated test cases (Section VII-B), with
the observations that the LSTM model’s functional cov-
erage can be approximated using our structural coverage
metrics (Section VII-B1) and our metrics complement
existing metrics in guiding the exploitation of the input
space (Section VII-B2).
2) detecting defects (Section VII-C), with the observations
that TESTRNN can not only find adversarial behaviours
for the robustness of RNNs (Section VII-C1) but also
identify backdoor inputs for the security of RNNs (Sec-
tion VII-C2).
3) usefulness of test case generation (Section VII-D), with
the observation that TESTRNN is efficient and effective
in achieving high coverage rates (Section VII-D).
4) comparison with dedicated defect detection (Sec-
tion VII-E), with the observation that our test method
can find a set of more diversified adversarial samples,
and these samples are more likely to occur in real world.
5) comparison with state-of-the-art tool DeepStellar (Sec-
tion VII-F), with the observations that our metrics are
better at guiding the exploitation of the input space and
TESTRNN may achieve good coverage on the metrics
in DeepStellar but not vice versa.
6) exhibition of LSTM internal working mechanism (Sec-
tion VII-G), with the conclusion that semantic meanings
behind the test metrics can help users understand the
1https://github.com/TrustAI/testRNN
learning mechanism of LSTM model, making a step
towards interpretable LSTM testing.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section II gives
the preliminaries. We will discuss the rationale of coverage-
guided testing in Section III. After this, we present our
proposed test metrics in Section IV. This is followed by
discussing in Section V how these new metrics are related to
the complete verification techniques, existing coverage met-
rics, and adversarial defence techniques. We present our test
case generation algorithm in Section VI and the experimental
evaluation in Section VII. Finally, we review related works in
Section VIII and conclude the paper in Section IX.
II. RNN PRELIMINARIES
Feedforward neural networks (FNNs) model a function φ :
X → Y that maps from input domain X to output domain Y :
given an input x ∈ X , it outputs the prediction y ∈ Y . For a
sequence of inputs x1, . . . , xn, an FNN φ considers each input
individually, that is, φ(xi) is independent from φ(xi+1).
By contrast, a recurrent neural network (RNN) processes
an input sequence by iteratively taking inputs one by one. A
recurrent layer can be modeled as a function ψ : X ′ × C ×
Y ′ → C × Y ′ such that ψ(xt, ct−1, ht−1) = (ct, ht) for t =
1...n, where t denotes the t-th time step, ct is the cell state used
to represent the intermediate memory and ht is the output of
the t-th time step. More specifically, the recurrent layer takes
three inputs: xt at the current time step, the prior memory state
ct−1 and the prior cell output ht−1; consequently, it updates
the current cell state ct and outputs current ht.
RNNs differ from each other given their respective defini-
tions, i.e., internal structures, of recurrent layer function ψ, of
which long short-term memory (LSTM) in Equation (1) is the
most popular and commonly used one.
ft = σ(Wf · [ht−1, xt] + bf )
it = σ(Wi · [ht−1, xt] + bi)
ct = ft ∗ ct−1 + it ∗ tanh(Wc · [ht−1, xt] + bc)
ot = σ(Wo · [ht−1, xt] + bo)
ht = ot ∗ tanh(ct)
(1)
In LSTM, σ is the sigmoid function and tanh is the hyperbolic
tangent function; W and b represent the weight matrix and
bias vector, respectively; ft, it, ot are internal gate variables
of the cell. In general, the recurrent layer (or LSTM layer)
is connected to non-recurrent layers such as fully connected
layers so that the cell output propagates further. We denote the
remaining layers with a function φ2 : Y ′ → Y . Meanwhile,
there can be feedforward layers connecting to the RNN layer,
and we let it be another function φ1 : X → X ′. As a result,
the RNN model that accepts a sequence of inputs x1, . . . , xn




a) Cell structure: The processing of a sequential input
x = {xt}nt=1 with an LSTM layer function ψ, i.e., ψ(x),
can be characterised by gate activations f = {ft}nt=0, i =
{it}nt=0, o = {ot}nt=0, cell states c = {ct}nt=0, and outputs
h = {ht}nt=0. We let S = {f, i, o, c, h} be a set of structural
components of LSTM, and use variable s to range over S.
b) Sequential structure: Each s represents one aspect of
the concrete status of an LSTM cell. To capture the interactions
between multiple LSTM steps, temporal semantics are often
used to understand how LSTM performs [29]. Test metrics
in this paper will rely on the structural information such
as aggregate knowledge ξht and remember rate ξ
f,avg
t , as
explained below, and their temporal relations.
Output h is seen as short-term memory (as opposed to c
for long-term memory) of LSTM. It is often used to under-
stand how information is updated, either positive or negative
according to the value of ht. Thus, we have
ξh,+t =
∑
{ht(j) | j ∈ {1, . . . , |ht|}, ht(j) > 0}
ξh,−t =
∑







Intuitively, ξht represents the aggregate knowledge regarding
short-term memory.
The forget gate f is a key factor for long-term memory in
LSTM, as it controls whether the aggregate information can
be passed on to the next (unfolded) cell or not. The portion







Fig. 1: Examples to show how positive and negative elements
of output vectors represent the information in MNIST and
IMDB models. The x-axis includes the inputs (bottom row)
and the y-axis includes Nz(ξht ) (top row), Nm(ξ
f,avg
t ) (second
row) and Nm(∆ξht ) (third row) values. In MNIST, each
column of pixels corresponds to a step in LSTM and in the
IMDB model each step represents a word in the movie review.
Example 2.1: Fig. 1 presents a set of visualisations to the
temporal update of the abstract information. In particular,
the top row contains curves for Nz(ξht ) and the second
row contains curves for Nm(ξf,avgt ), changed with respect
to the time. The third row visualises the evolution of step-
wise change information Nm(∆ξht ). Nz and Nm are two
normalization function which will be introduced later.
Let A = {+,−, avg} be a set of symbols representing
the abstraction functions as in Eq. (2-3). The above can be
generalised to work with any s ∈ S and a ∈ A. For ξs,at , once
given a fixed input x, we may write ξs,at,x .
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This section explains why the coverage guided testing is
useful in analysing RNNs and how to reasonably justify its
effectiveness. Fig. 2(Left) presents the connection between
verification and testing in this context. While incomplete, test-
ing has been shown practical – and in many cases sufficiently
effective – in providing assurance to the quality of software.
As in Fig. 2, these two approaches overlap on the “Flaws”.
Verification can detect defects because it exhaustively exploits
all internal behaviour of RNNs, which include defective be-
haviours. On the other hand, testing approach uses test cases
to approximate – or sample – the internal behaviour. Due
to the finite sampling, defects may or may not be detected.
Therefore, testing needs to be systematic to be effective in
defect detection, and coverage-guided testing is one of the
main approaches.
Due to the size and the temporal semantics of RNNs, it
becomes important to find a (meaningful) set of metrics to
guide the sampling or the test case generation. Our proposed
set of coverage metrics plays the role of such guidance – as
suggested in Fig. 2(Left), coverage-guided testing generates a
set of test cases to exploit the internal behaviour of the neural
networks. We note, such coverage metric does not have to be
strongly correlated to adversarial samples [23], [11] (a specific
type of defects corresponding to the robustness requirement of
a neural network). What really matters is, within the testing
budget, to find defects that are as diverse and natural as
possible so that fixing them would gain maximised impact
on the delivered reliability.
There are two main goals of testing [13]: debug testing,
which probes the software for defects, and operational testing,
which is to gain confidence that the software is reliable [54].
The former seeks test cases to excite as many failures as
possible (then we may fix the defects behind them), but the
test cases normally are not representative of the software’s
day-to-day operation. Confidence in the delivered reliability
can only be gained by the later, i.e. testing that represents the
typical usage (the operational profile) [20]. Coverage-guided
testing belongs to the former, while our method should also be
designed in the best interest for the operational reliability. That
is, our test cases should be more likely generated from the high
probability density area on the operational profile, compared to
attack-based and other state-of-the-art debug testing methods,
so that the defects found are more “practical” in the sense
that fixing them would effectively improve the operational
reliability.
The question is on how effective a specific testing approach
is when exploiting the internal behaviour. Below, we provide
a few guidelines by evaluating the connections of entities in
Fig. 2(Left) (shown with red color).
First, the test cases are required to be diversified and
natural, so as to cover the LSTM internal behaviour compre-
hensively. This is to avoid the test cases being clotted together
Fig. 2: (Left) Connection of Verification and Coverage Guided Testing Frameworks. Verification and testing overlap on “Flaws”,
representing that they have the same objective. From verification to testing, an approximation is made, i.e., test cases approximate
the LSTM internal behaviour. Guidelines (colored with red) are needed to ensure the approximation quality. (Right) Relation
between Coverage Metrics. NC: neuron coverage [32], BS: basic state coverage [12], BT: basic transition coverage [12],
MC/DC: modified condition/decision coverage [39]. Arrows represent the “weaker than” relation between metrics.
in a small region of the input space (representing a certain
type of defects) and lose the ability of finding other defects
manifested in different regions. However, it is easy to generate
diversified test cases by “forcing diversity” (e.g., by selecting
inputs that maximise the average inter-point distance). Thus
diversity criteria is only sensible when paired with naturalness
– tests cases should not be far from the RNN’s data manifold
(i.e., potentially high density area of its future optional profile).
Second, the test cases can reveal defects. While it is hard to
establish strong correlation between test metrics and a specific
type of defects, it is still a reasonable request that the generated
test cases reveal defects as many as possible. Third, the test
case generation algorithm needs to be effective, in terms of
its ability in improving the coverage rate with diversified and
natural test cases. Finally, to show that the generated test cases
are sufficiently representative, we may use the test cases to
exhibit the working mechanism of LSTM.
Moreover, given the complexity of the internal behaviour
in RNNs, we believe a set of coverage metrics are needed
to ensure that the above guidelines can be achieved. In an
ideal case where the testing budget is sufficient, our metrics
in the paper may complement – instead of replace – others,
and vice versa. These guidelines will be used when designing
our experiments in Section VII.
IV. LSTM TEST COVERAGE METRICS
In this section, we present a family of three coverage
metrics (BC, SC and TC) for the testing of LSTM models.
These metrics take into account both the values of structural
information ξs,at for s ∈ S and a ∈ A as in Eq. (2-3) and their
step-wise and bounded-length temporal relations. We utilize
two normalization methods for the convenience of determining
thresholds, independent of specific dataset. Nz and Nm are z-







where parameters µ, σ, min and max can be derived from
the training dataset. The z-score normalization is suitable for
preprocessing test conditions quantifying the relations between
different features, e.g., TC, while min-max normalization is
better for the test conditions to hit the large activation values,
e.g., BC and SC. Given a time series of length n, we can
choose the sequence of interest [t1, t2] (t1 ≥ 1 and t2 ≤ n) to
implement the following coverage metrics.
a) Boundary Coverage (BC): Boundary values are often
regarded as important cases in software testing, as they could
exploit extreme software behaviours. We therefore define BC
for depicting test conditions that cover the boundary values of
the LSTM data flow as follows.
{Nm(ξs,at ) ≥ αmax, Nm(ξ
s,a
t ) ≤ αmin | t ∈ {t1...t2}}
Thresholds αmax and αmin are chosen from interval [0, 1].
The min, max values can be estimated using values computed
over the training dataset {ξs,at,x | t ∈ {t1...t2}, x ∈ Dtrain}.
Example 4.1: Suppose that there is a test condition
Nm(ξi,avgt ) > 0.9. It requires that the Nm(ξ
i,avg
t ) value is
greater than threshold 0.9. Intuitively, this condition exercises
LSTM’s learning ability on the input at time t. As Eq. 1
shows, the input gate i controls how much information from
the input is received by the network: Nm(ξi,avgt ) = 1 implies
that all its information is added to the long-term memory c and
Nm(ξi,avgt ) = 0 implies that no input information is added.
b) Step-wise Coverage (SC): SC characterizes the tem-







t−1| to outline the maximum change of the
structural component s ∈ S at time t. E.g., ∆ξht is the change
of short-term memory at time t. Then, the SC test conditions
are defined as follows.
{Nm(∆ξst ) ≥ αSC | t ∈ {t1...t2}}
This set defines test conditions for LSTM’s step-wise updates
that exceed a threshold αSC . Parameters for Nm are derived
from {∆ξst,x | t ∈ {t1...t2}, x ∈ Dtrain}.
Example 4.2: The intuition behind step-wise coverage is to
capture these significant inputs to the LSTM. As shown by the
sentiment analysis LSTM example in Fig. 1 (Right), given two
inputs, sensitive words “like”, “horrible”, “fun” trigger greater
Nm(∆ξht ) values than words “movie”, “really”, and “had”.
Fig. 3: Illustration of projecting a temporal curve (Gaussian
distribution) into a sequence of symbols acbab.
c) Temporal Coverage (TC): While the power of LSTM
comes from its ability to memorize values over arbitrary time
intervals, its test metrics need to ensure that the temporal
patterns of memory updates are fully tested. This is essen-
tially a time series classification problem and is intractable.
In this part, we define test conditions to exploit temporal
patterns of bounded length. Different from dynamic systems
where the temporal relation can be infinite [8], the temporal
relations in RNNs are always finite, because of the finite-
sized input. Therefore, the bounded length does not lower
the expressiveness of the test conditions. In particular, to
facilitate the enumeration of all test conditions, we refer to
symbolic aggregate approximation (SAX) [24] to convert any
complicated time series of length v (v is usually a large
number) into a symbolic sequence of length w (v >> w).
First of all, given any temporal curve ξs = {ξst }
t2
t=t1 , we can
reduce the dimension of temporal sequence from v = t2 − t1








The main idea of PAA is to approximate the original time
series by splitting them into w equal sized segments and
average the values in each segment. For example, the temporal
curve in Fig. 3 is split into w = 5 dimensions. The new
approximated curve is denoted as ξ̂s = {ξ̂sj}wj=1.
Then, we can define the symbolic representation for the
temporal curve after dimensionality reduction. We start from
z-normalizing ξ̂s and discretising D(Nz(ξ̂s)) – the domain of
Nz(ξ̂s) – into a set Γ of sub-ranges. This discretization can
refer to the distribution of Nz(ξ̂sj ), which can be estimated
by conducting probability distribution fitting over the training
dataset (since ξ̂s is z-normalized, Nz(ξ̂sj ) is subject to the
standard normal distribution). Then, every normalized time
series {Nz(ξ̂sj )}wj=1 can be represented as a sequence of
symbols in the standard way. For example, in Fig. 3, the
continuous space of Nz(ξ̂s,a) is split into a set of three sub-
ranges Γ = {a, b, c}.
Finally, test conditions from TC for covering a set of sym-
bolic representations across multiple time steps [t1, t2] ⊆ [1, n]
can be expressed as follows.
{`1`2...`w | `j ∈ Γ, j ∈ [1, w]} (5)
Essentially, TC requests the testing to meet a set of temporal
patterns for a specific time span [t1, t2]. The total number of
temporal patterns for TC to cover is |Γ|w. We remark that with
the help of SAX, test conditions in TC is scalable in tackling
the complexity of time series.
Example 4.3: Fig. 1 (top row) demonstrates the temporal
curve of hidden memory for each input across a selected time
span. The curve is for Nz(ξht ) and it is a clear illustration on
the information processing of LSTM for each input. Fig. 3
further shows how a time series is converted into its symbolic
representation acbab with Γ = {a, b, c} and w = 5.
V. RELATION WITH RNN DEFECTS
The aforementioned three coverage metrics encourage the
exploration of the LSTM internal behaviour, which is helpful
in detecting the RNN defects. In this section, we discuss
the rationale behind by referring to the general relation
(Fig. 2(Right)) between our new coverage metrics, the com-
plete verification and a few existing coverage metrics. All
discussions are supported by our experiments in Section VII.
a) Comparing with Complete Verification Techniques:
For an input of length n, we denote the collection of curves
(as in Fig. 3) for f, i, o as Curv. It precisely identifies an
output (extracted features of the LSTM layer) and corresponds
with a set of inputs (which cannot be differentiated by the
LSTM layer). Let Cf , Co, and Ci be the (possibly infinite)
set of possible curves for their respective gates f, o, i. We have
Curv = Cf×Co×Ci. We also have curves Ch and Co, which
can be obtained from Curv according to Equation (1).
A complete verification method determines if there is an
input that can lead to any unexpected behaviour. That is, it is
equivalent to determine if there is a combined curve in Curv
that leads to the unexpected classification2. To this end, TC
(and its test case generation) can be seen as an approach to
exhaustively, but discretely, explore one of the curve sets Cs
for s ∈ S. Therefore, while the combination of TC working
on different gates may provide a complete verification, in
general the exploration of internal behaviour through TC is
a necessary, but insufficient, approach for verification.
b) Comparing with Other Coverage Metrics: The pur-
pose of TC is to encourage the exploration of either Cf ,
Co, or Ci with the generated test cases. However, such
exploration may be computational intensive – the complexity
is exponential with respect to the length n. Since BC and
SC do not consider the temporal relation between steps or
boundary values, they are computationally more manageable.
Assuming that under ideal parameter settings (e.g., thresholds
αmax and αSC and the set Γ of symbols), we say that a metric
A is weaker than another B if for any test suite, it cannot have
a lower coverage rate w.r.t. A than that of B. It is not hard to
see that, both BC and SC are weaker than TC, and BC and
SC are incomparable, as shown in Fig. 2(Right).
2As shown in the experiments, an unexpected classification can be normal
mis-classification or caused by e.g. backdoor attacks and adversarial inputs.
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Fig. 4: Coverage-guided LSTM testing in TESTRNN
Besides the new BC and SC, TC is stronger than existing
coverage metrics that are originally proposed for CNNs. For
example, neuron coverage (NC) [32], which requires the
coverage of neurons whose value is over a threshold (e.g., 0 for
ReLU activation function), can be adapted to work with say the
gate value or hidden state value. In this case, it is weaker than
TC and incomparable with SC. Although NC and BC have
similar formal expressions, BC concerns the boundary value
rather than a value that indicates the activation status. For the
MC/DC metrics [39], they can be adapted to work between
time steps in the new context of RNNs. With such adaptation,
MC/DC encourages the exploration of relations between time
steps, and therefore are weaker than TC.
DeepStellar [12] abstracts the evolution of hidden states of
an RNN into a discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) before
considering state and transition coverage. Its basic state cov-
erage (BS) and basic transition coverage (BT) are designed to
cover the possible state values and possible transitions. Given
that the DTMC is an abstraction of the curves Ch, BS and BT
are both weaker than BC and SC, respectively.
Remarkably, the relations in Fig. 2(Right) are based on
theoretical analysis under “ideal parameter settings”. They do
not hold for any parameter settings. In our experiments in
Section VII, we might observe the coverage rates on the same
test set and the aforementioned relations are not in alignment,
because of the specific parameter settings used (cf. Table III).
c) Defence Techniques for Robustness and Security:
Some effective adversarial defence techniques, e.g. [9], are
based on the observation that the adversarial samples exhibit
different internal behaviour to those behaviour of training data
samples. For security concerns like backdoor attack, activation
patterns are also considered in the detection techniques such as
[6]. Consequently, with the exploration of more RNN internal
behaviour other than those appeared in the training data, it is
more likely that RNNs defects will be exposed.
VI. COVERAGE GUIDED TEST CASE GENERATION
Coverage metrics in Section IV define test conditions that
request particular patterns of long/short-term updates of ab-
stracted information across multiple LSTM time steps. Given
an LSTM network and a specific test metric, the coverage
rate denotes the percentage of test conditions that have been
satisfied over a set of test cases, i.e., test suite. To more
efficiently achieve high coverage rate, in this section, we
develop the coverage guided test case generation, as outlined in
Fig. 4. We remark that, although focus of this paper is LSTM,
the proposed testing approach (including both test metrics and
tests generation) can be extended to work with other kinds of
RNNs which use customized recurrent layer structures.
The TESTRNN test case generation algorithm is detailed in
Alg. 1. The test suite T is initialized with T0, a corpus of seed
inputs (Line 1). New test cases are generated by mutating seed
inputs. It keeps the traceability of test cases via a mapping orig
that maps each test case generated back to its seed origin.
The main body of Alg. 1 is a loop (Lines 5−10) that
iterates unless some target coverage level is reached (Line 4).
At each iteration, a test input x is selected from the input
corpus T (Line 5), and it is mutated following the pre-defined
mutation function m (Line 6). Newly generated test inputs
are added into T (Line 7), where they are queued for the next
iteration. If the generated test case does not pass the oracle
(Section VI-C0a), it represents a defect and it is added to Tadv
(Lines 9-10).
Algorithm 1: TESTRNN Algorithm
Input:
φ: RNN to be tested
T0: a set of seed inputs
m: a mutation function
roracle: oracle radius
Output:
T : a set of test cases
Tadv: a set of discovered adversarial samples
1 T ← T0
2 orig ← dict()
3 orig[x]← x for all x ∈ T0
4 while coverage rate is not satisfied do
5 x← select an element from T
6 x′ ← m(x)
7 T ← T ∪ {x′}
8 orig[x′]← orig[x]
9 if ||orig(x)− x′||2 ≤ roracle and φ(x) 6= φ(x′) then
10 Tadv ← Tadv ∪ {x′}
11 return T , Tadv
A. Selection Policies and Queuing
Not all inputs in the corpus T are equivalently important,
and they are ranked once added to the input queue (as
illustrated in Fig. 4). When sorting queuing inputs on T for
the Mutator engine, TESTRNN particularly prioritizes two
kinds of test inputs: those that are promising in leading to
the satisfaction of un-fulfilled test conditions and those that
can trigger erroneous behaviours.
Thanks to its modular design, new selection policies can
be easily integrated into TESTRNN as plug-ins (as indicated
by cloud shapes in Fig. 4). The design of TESTRNN also
features its high parallelism. The use of dynamically allocated
input queues further optimises its runtime performance.
B. Mutation Policies
The Mutator engine lays at the core of TESTRNN. In
particular, there are two types of mutation function m in
Alg. 1: random mutation mrnd and targeted mutation mtarg.
a) Random Mutation: When the LSTM input has con-
tinuous values (e.g., image input), Gaussian noises with fixed
mean and variance are added to the input. Meanwhile, for
discrete value input (e.g., IMDB movie reviews for sentiment
analysis), a set of problem-specific mutation functions M are
defined. The detail is in the experiment set-up (Section VII-A).
b) Targeted Mutation: The targeted mutation is based on
genetic algorithm for test case generation. Genetic algorithm
is an evolutionary approach inspired by the process of natural
selection. Mutations are selected only when they improve over
the existing test cases on some pre-defined fitness function.
The implementation of genetic algorithm comprises of four
steps: initialization, selection, crossover and mutation. The last
three steps are running iteratively till the solution is found.
Initialization. Firstly, we initialize the population by choos-
ing a test case from the previous running cases. The test case
is very close to the satisfaction of test condition.
Selection. Next, we select best few test cases from the pop-
ulation to the mating pool, evaluated by the fitness function.
For the three classes of test conditions (BC, SC, TC) with
respect to some s ∈ S and a ∈ A, we define the following
fitness function as the distance to their respective targets, e.g.,
JBC(x) = αmax −Nm(ξs,ax,t )





where t, t1, t2, j are time steps that can be inferred from the
context. uj = [ul, ur] is the interval of sub-range, represented
by some symbol in Γ. The fitness of temporal curve to the
targeted symbolic curve is to calculate the Manhattan distance,
the absolute difference between structure value Nz(ξ̂sx,j) and
the symbolic interval uj is
dist(Nz(ξ̂sx,j), uj) =

Nz(ξ̂sx,j)− ur if Nz(ξ̂sx,j) > ur
ul −Nz(ξ̂sx,j) if Nz(ξ̂sx,j) < ul
0 else
Intuitively, the fitness function (also called coverage loss)
J(x) is estimates the distance to the satisfaction of an un-
fulfilled test condition. J(x) ≤ 0 means that the test condition
is covered. By generating test cases with the objective of grad-
ually minimising the loss, the targeted mutation is essentially
a greedy search algorithm.
Example 6.1: In Fig. 3, the symbolic representation of tem-
poral curve is acbab; the fitness of the curve to test condition
bbcca can be calculated as JTC = J1 + J2 + J3 + J4 + J5.
Crossover. Crossover is trivial in our test case generation
for RNNs. This is mainly because the inputs to RNNs are
usually discrete, which means the offspring of two parents
by crossover (like exchanging chromosome) may be invalid
due to the undefined semantic meanings. To avoid the validity
issue, we skip this step and using mutation methods directly.
Mutation. We randomly mutate the test cases in the mating
pool with user-defined functionM in order to generate a new
population for the next iteration. The previous population is
replaced with the new one. It should be noticed that the parents
in the mating pool are also added to the new population to
make sure that solutions are towards good directions during
the iterations.
Algorithm 2: Targeted Mutation
Input:
J : fitness function
γ: maximun iteration number
k: number of parents for mating pool
n: number of offsprings mutated from one parent
mrnd: a random mutation function
x′: a test case that is the closest to satisfy test condition
Output:
x′new: a test case covering new test condition
1 itr = 0
2 add x′ to the population set P
3 while test condition is not satisfied in P and itr < γ do
4 sort individual x ∈ P according to fitness J(x)
5 select the best k individuals in P and add them to P ∗
6 P ∗ ∪mrnd(P ∗, n)
7 P ← P ∗
8 itr = itr + 1
9 x′new = argminJ(x), for x ∈ P
10 return x′new
The targeted mutation mtarg is shown in Algorithm 2. At
each iteration, we choose k best individuals in the population
P (except for the first iteration where we only have a seed).
Each individual is utilized to generate n test cases by random
mutation function mrnd. All the mutants along with the k
parents in P ∗ will replace the old population P . The whole
process is repeated until the solution is found or the maximum
iteration is reached.
C. Test Set Evaluation
a) Test Oracle: Test oracle determines if a test case
passes or fails. We define a set of norm-balls, each of which is
centered around a data sample with known label. The radius
roracle of norm-balls intuitively means that a human cannot
differentiate between inputs within a norm ball. In this paper,
Euclidean distance, i.e. L2-norm || · ||2 is used. A test case x′
is said to not pass the oracle if (1) x′ is within the norm-ball
of some known sample x, i.e., ||x−x′||2 ≤ roracle, and (2) x′
has a different classification from x, i.e., ϕ(x) 6= ϕ(x′). Take
the definition in [41], a test case does not pass the oracle is
an adversarial sample. We use adversary rate to denote the
percentage of test cases that do not pass the oracle.
b) Diversity of Test Set: More diversified test cases will
explore more input space and thus are more likely to uncover
different defects. Unfortunately, a unified, accurate way to
measure diversity may not exist. We consider the following
three intuitive, yet measurable proxies to the diversity.
First, diversity can refer to the number of categories the
generated test cases belonging to. Intuitively, if the labels
of two test cases are different, they are dissimilar and more
diversified than two test cases with the same label. Second,
test metrics (e.g., neuron coverage, SC, BC and TC) are to
guide the exploitation of different internal behaviours of RNNs
(cf. Section IV). Therefore, a test set that can achieve higher
coverage on more test metrics is more diversified than the
other. Third, if the distance in input space, measured with
L1, L2, and L∞ norm, can represent the semantic similarity
between test cases, we may define the diversity by quantifying
the relative positions of test cases to the seed input. Suppose
a test set T contains n test cases, generated from a seed x0,
the angular-based diversity measure [15] of T is
Diversity(T ) = −(
n∑
i,j=1
< xi − x0, xj − x0 >
||xi − x0|| ||xj − x0||
)/n2 (6)
This diversity measure is formed by the cosine similarity [51]
and bounded by [−1, 1]. Since the test cases are generated
by adding small perturbations to the seed input, the angular-
based diversity is to measure if the test cases are uniformly
distributed around the seed input x0. A larger Diversity(T )
represents a more diversified T .
VII. EVALUATION
We evaluate our TESTRNN approach with an extensive set
of experiments from the following aspects: (1) the diversity
of test cases generated under the guidance of the coverage
metrics (Section VII-B), (2) the ability of detecting RNN
defects (Section VII-C), (3) the effectiveness of the test case
generation algorithms (Section VII-D), (4) the advantages
over state-of-the-art attack tool [31] (Section VII-E), (5) the
difference from state-of-the-art RNN testing tool DeepStellar
[12] (Section VII-F), and (6) the exhibition of LSTM internal
working mechanism (Section VII-G). Specifically, we study
the following research questions (RQs):
• RQ1: will the exploitation of internal behaviour lead to
the testing of different LSTM functions?
• RQ2: are our new metrics needed when we already have
existing metrics?
• RQ3: will the exploitation of internal behaviour lead to
the detection of adversarial samples?
• RQ4: will the exploitation of internal behaviour lead to
the identification of backdoor attacks?
• RQ5: Can the test case generation algorithm achieve high
coverage for the proposed test metrics?
• RQ6: What are the advantages of TESTRNN over attack-
based methods for detecting adversarial samples?
• RQ7: What are the similarities and differences between
DeepStellar and TESTRNN?
• RQ8: Are the testing results based on the proposed test
metrics helpful on making LSTM interpretable?
All the experiments are run on a desktop with Intel(R)
Core(TM) i7 CPU @ 3.80 GHz and 16 GB Memory.
A. Experimental Setup
1) RNNs under Evaluation: Our experiments are conducted
on a diverse set of LSTM benchmarks, including:
a) MNIST Handwritten Digits Analysis by LSTM: The
MNIST database, containing a set of 60, 000 grey-scale images
of size 28×28, is used to train a RNN model with 4 layers. The
first two layers are LSTM layers, which are correspondingly
connected and fed with rows of input images. That is, each
input image is encoded as the row vector of shape (28, 128)
by the first LSTM layer, and then second layer will do further
processing to output an image vector representing the whole
image. Finally, two fully-connected layers with ReLU and
SoftMax activation functions respectively, are used to process
the extracted feature information to get the classification
result. The model achieves 99.2% accuracy in training dataset
(50, 000 samples) and 98.7% accuracy in the default MNIST
test dataset (10, 000 samples).
b) Sentiment Analysis by LSTM: The sentiment analysis
network has three layers, i.e., an embedding layer, an LSTM
layer, and a fully-connected layer, with 213301 trainable
parameters. The embedding layer takes as input a vector of
length 500 and outputs a 500×32 matrix, which is then fed
into the LSTM layer. Subsequently, there is a fully-connected
layer of 100 neurons.
c) Lipophilicity Analysis by LSTM: We trained an LSTM
regression network on a Lipophilicity dataset from the Molecu-
leNet [49]. The model has four layers: an embedding layer, an
LSTM layer, a dropout layer, and a fully connected layer. The
input is a SMILES string representing a molecular structure
and the output is its prediction of Lipophilicity. A dictionary is
used to map the symbols in the SMILES string to integers. We
use the length of the longest SMILES in training dataset as the
number of cells for the LSTM layer. Similar to text processing
in the IMDB model, short SMILES inputs are padded with 0s
to the left side. We use the root mean square error (RMSE)
as the measurement of model accuracy. Our trained model
achieves RMSE = 0.2371 in training dataset and RMSE =
0.6278 in test dataset, which are better than the traditional
and convolutional methods used in [49].
d) Video Recognition for Human Behaviour: A large
scale VGG16+LSTM network is trained over the UCF101
dataset [38]. VGG16, a CNN for ImageNet, extracts features
from individual frames of a video. Then, the sequence of frame
features are analysed by LSTM layer for classification.
2) Test Metrics: We conduct experiments on several con-
crete test metrics, i.e., BC (for ξf,avgt ), SC (for ∆ξ
h
t ), and TC
(for ξht ). The configuration of thresholds are presented in Table
III. Although the proposed three test metrics can be applied to
every internal vector of LSTM cell, like f, i, o, c, h, the current
settings represent better semantic meanings. The interpretation
of the testing results is discussed in Section VII-G.
3) Input Mutation: For MNIST model, we add Gaussian
noise to input image and round off the decimals around 0 and
1 to make the pixel value stay within the value range.
TABLE II: Summary of RNN models under testing
Test Model No. of Classes Test Acc. Seq. of Interest oracle
MNIST 9 98.7% [4,24] 0.01
IMDB 2 86.2% [400,500] 0.05
Lipophilicity None RMSE = 0.6278 [60,80] None
UCF101 101 88.6% [1,11] 0.1
TABLE III: Configuration of test metrics
Coverage Metrcis Parameter Configuration
Neuron Coverage (NC) Threshold = 0
K-multisection Neuron Coverage (KMNC) k = 10
Neuron Boundary Coverage (NBC) LB = −0.7, UB = 0.7
Strong Neuron Activation Coverage (SNAC) UB = 0.7
Boundary Coverage (BC) αmax = 0.8
Step-wise Coverage (SC) αsc = 0.6
Temporal Coverage (TC) w = 5, |Γ| = 3
The input to IMDB model is a sequence of words, on
which a random change may lead to an unrecognisable (and
invalid) text paragraph. To avoid this, we take a set M of
mutants from the EDA toolkit [47], which was originally
designed to augment the training data for improvement on text
classification tasks. This ensures the mutated text paragraphs
are always valid. In our experiments, we consider four muta-
tion operations, i.e., M includes (1) Synonym Replacement,
(2) Random Insertion, (3) Random Swap, and (4) Random
Deletion. The text meanings are reserved in all mutations.
For Lipophilicity model, we take a setM of mutants which
change the SMILES string without affecting the molecular
structure it represents. The enumeration of possible SMILES
for a molecule is implemented with the Python cheminfor-
matics package RDkit [35]. Each input SMILES string is
converted into its molfile format, based on which the atom
order is changed randomly before converting back. There may
be several SMILES strings representing the same molecular
structure. The enumerated SMILES strings are the test cases.
For UCF101 model, we add Gaussian noise to the original
video frames instead of the feature inputs to the LSTM layer.
4) Oracle Setting: We use one fixed oracle radius for each
model across all experiments. For continuous inputs, like
images and videos, we calculate the euclidean distance as
the measurement of perturbation. For the discrete inputs, like
text, We refer to the alpha parameter provided by the EDA
toolkit, which approximately means the percent of words in the
sentence that will be changed. That said, the roracle for each
RNN are listed in Table II. Note, we let roracle = None for the
Lipophilicity model, suggesting that no constraint is imposed
on the norm ball. Hence, the determination of adversarial
example is completely based on the classification. This is
because, as suggested before, the test cases are only generated
from those SMILES strings with the same molecular structure.
B. Diversity of Test Cases
Test metrics can be seen as a proxy to exploit the input
space, and intuitively more diversified test cases will explore
more input space and thus are more likely to uncover different
defects. Thus, we investigate if the achievement of high cover-
age will indeed lead to the testing of different LSTM functions
(RQ1), and if our new metrics encourage the exploitation of
more regions in the input space than existing metrics (RQ2).
TABLE IV: Impact of seeds to coverage metrics




NC KMNC NBC SNAC BC SC TC
MNIST 100 / 5000 1 0.93 0.65 0.41 0.44 0.10 0.43 0.3810 1.00 0.88 0.77 0.80 0.95 0.86 0.79
IMDB 100 / 5000 1 1.00 0.29 0.01 0.01 0.23 0.45 0.242 1.00 0.37 0.01 0.01 0.81 0.54 0.64
Lipophilicity 10 / 2000 1 0.81 0.31 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.0410 1.00 0.86 0.68 0.66 0.95 0.95 0.90
UCF101 100 / 5000 1 1.00 0.47 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.1610 1.00 0.76 0.36 0.34 0.58 0.58 0.67
TABLE V: Complementarity of test metrics: comparison be-
tween neuron level test metrics and the proposed TESTRNN
metrics in minimal test suite
Test Model Target Metrics Neuron Level Metrics TESTRNN MetricsNC KMNC NBC SNAC BC SC TC
MNIST
NC 1.00 0.61 0.39 0.44 0.10 0.00 0.10
KMNC 1.00 0.85 0.67 0.72 0.10 0.29 0.44
NBC 1.00 0.77 0.73 0.75 0.14 0.19 0.28
SNAC 0.98 0.73 0.62 0.75 0.10 0.14 0.19
IMDB
NC 1.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
KMNC 1.00 0.39 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07
NBC 0.48 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
SNAC 0.47 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lipophilicity
NC 1.00 0.43 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.03
KMNC 1.00 0.92 0.70 0.69 0.40 0.20 0.38
NBC 1.00 0.84 0.81 0.78 0.50 0.20 0.22
SNAC 1.00 0.77 0.62 0.78 0.40 0.20 0.13
UCF101
NC 1.00 0.48 0.26 0.36 0.10 0.10 0.15
KMNC 1.00 0.74 0.60 0.66 0.18 0.10 0.20
NBC 1.00 0.65 0.75 0.58 0.15 0.18 0.16
SNAC 1.00 0.76 0.68 0.84 0.22 0.18 0.20
1) Approximation of LSTM functional coverage (RQ1):
Table IV shows that LSTM model’s functional coverage can
be approximated by using TESTRNN metrics. This is based on
the assumption that a data label (i.e., category) corresponds to
a “functional feature” of the LSTM. We observe that, by only
using one category of seeds input, it is hard to achieve high
coverage rate for TESTRNN metrics, even when thousands
of test cases are generated. In contrast, with seeds input
from more categories, the generated test cases from targeted
mutation can broadly explore the input space and more internal
behaviours of RNNs. Thus, all rates of TESTRNN coverage
metrics are significantly improved, given the test set. Table IV
also records the coverage of neuron level metrics, which are
widely used in the CNNs/FNNs. These test metrics show less
sensitivity with respect to the diversity of functional features in
the test suite, e.g., the NC coverage can already reach almost
100% by only using test cases of one label.
Answer to RQ1: The exploitation of internal be-
haviour by TESTRNN can approximate the testing of
different LSTM functional features.
2) Comparison with Neuron Level Coverage (RQ2): We
implement the Neuron Coverage (NC) [33], k-multisection
Neuron Coverage (KMNC), Neuron Boundary Coverage
(NBC) and Strong Neuron Activation Coverage (SNAC) [25]
on the testing layers of our LSTM models. We note that the
concept “neuron” is ambiguous in RNNs, since the hidden
output of RNNs’ cells are vectors. Here, we consider covering
each element of the hidden output h in the testing layer.
Results are presented in Table IV and V.
In the experiments, we find that NC can be trivially
achieved. Shown in Table IV, NC is not suitable for explor-
ing RNNs’ internal functionality, since one category’s seeds
input is enough for the high coverage of neuron activation.
Moreover, we find that other neuron level test metrics may be
impossible to satisfy for IMDB test model. The low coverage
rate of KMNC, NBC and SNAC indicates that the activation of
neurons for IMDB model is concentrated in a small interval.
In other words, the neuron level test metrics cannot be a good
option to search for diverse test cases.
Table V shows the complementarity of neuron level test
metrics and our proposed TESTRNN metrics. A set of comple-
mentary test metrics (and test cases) can enhance the diversity
of the testing. In the experiments, we take minimal test suite,
in which the removal of any test case may lead to the reduction
of coverage rate. The consideration of the minimality of test
suite enables a fair comparison since it reduces the overlaps as
much as possible. The results confirm that a test suite which
can achieve high coverage for neuron level test metrics is not
necessary to get the high coverage for RNN test metrics. For
example, in the MNIST LSTM model, test cases that achieve
100% NC can only cover less than 10% of the overall test
conditions by TESTRNN metrics (with 10% BC, 0% SC and
10% TC). Similar patterns also happen to other models. That
means the proposed test metrics provide the guide for the
selection of additional test cases, which are complementary
to those guided by the neuron level test metrics.
Moreover, we discover that there are many redundancy of
test requirements, regarding to the relation between individual
test metric in neuron level category. For example, if we derive
a test suite which targets at increasing the coverage of KMNC,
NBC and SNAC both get the high coverage results.
Answer to RQ2: The TESTRNN metrics exhibit a
dramatic portion of LSTM internal behaviours that
cannot be explored by existing metrics.
C. Detecting RNN Defects
1) Searching for Adversarial Samples (RQ3): We collect
the set of normal perturbed samples (N) and adversarial
samples (A), respectively. First, normal perturbed samples are
added to the test set to witness the increase of the coverage.
When the coverage is difficult to improve, adversarial samples
are considered. The update of whole process is illustrated in
Fig. 5. The dashed vertical line distinguish the coverage update
with normal perturbed samples from that with adversarial
samples. It should be noted that the coverage update of some
test metrics is stepped growth, due to the small amount of total
test conditions which is shwon in Table II.
Fig. 5 reveals that normal perturbed samples can only satisfy
part of test conditions, while the rest are more sensitive to
the adversarial samples. In all the plots, coverage of RNN test
metrics can be further increased in consideration of adversarial
samples. A more obvious example is, the TC coverage of
IMDB model tend to saturate in the left side when only normal
perturbed samples are utilized. In the right side, the coverage
curve becomes steep, indicating the discovery of test cases
capturing new internal behaviors.
In addition to the sensitivity of test metrics to adversarial
samples, we show how to compare the robustness of models
Fig. 5: Update of coverage with normal perturbed samples
(‘N’) and adversarial samples (‘A’)
TABLE VI: Comparing the robustness of models via coverage
guided testing







MNIST 1 5958 0.060 176 0.48 0.81 0.902 3570 0.075 184 0.57 0.86 0.90
IMDB 1 5841 0.039 138 0.94 0.93 0.752 1575 0.047 68 0.62 0.72 0.75
Lipophilicity 1 2936 0.371 191 0.95 1.00 0.952 6727 0.010 44 0.88 1.00 0.95
UCF101 1 6352 0.420 182 0.98 0.95 0.602 6100 0.250 90 0.95 0.92 0.60
via coverage guided testing. We use TC as the termination
condition to generate a test suite and calculate the adversarial
rate. To achieve the high coverage of test metrics, we use
genetic algorithm for test case generation, more details of
which can be seen in Section VI-B. The other settings remain
the same for the fair comparison.
As shown in Table VI, adversarial samples rate and number
of unique adversarial samples in the generated test suite are
two important indicators for the robustness evaluation. The
unique adversarial samples refer to the adversarial samples
crafted from distinct seeds input. For a set of trained models,
we pursue the model, the test suite of which contains less
amount of adversarial samples and unique adversarial samples.
For example, we pick up model 2 for ipophilicity prediction,
since the values of two indicators are way smaller than that of
model 1. We comment that with large enough amount of test
cases, coverage-guide testing approach provides a new way
for the measure and selection of more robust classifier. This
is compatible with the results in [39] that a poorly trained
neural network exposes more adversarial samples subject to
well-defined coverage guided testing.
Answer to RQ3: By exploiting the model’s internal
behaviours, TESTRNN is able to capture the LSTM
adversarial samples.
TABLE VII: Sensitivity of test metrics to backdoor samples
in MNIST dataset
Model Test Acc.(C / B) Data
Class 0 Class 6 Class 9
BC SC TC BC SC TC BC SC TC
Benign 99.1% / 9.5%
T 0.39 0.25 0.16 0.29 0.18 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.22
T + C 0.39 0.25 0.17 0.29 0.18 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.22
T + B 0.39 0.25 0.17 0.29 0.18 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.22
Malicious 98.7% / 100%
T 0.39 0.18 0.30 0.25 0.18 0.60 0.07 0.18 0.27
T + C 0.39 0.18 0.30 0.25 0.18 0.60 0.07 0.18 0.27
T + B 0.39 0.25 0.33 0.25 0.21 0.63 0.07 0.21 0.29
2) Detecting Backdoor input in RNNs (RQ4): We inves-
tigate the possibility of applying coverage-guided testing to
the detection of backdoor input in neural networks. We try
to exploit if there is any difference between clean input and
backdoor input which can be captured by our proposed test
metrics. Examples of backdoor input are illustrated in Fig. 6.
We train two handwritten digits recognition models, one of
which is benign classifier and the other one is the malicious
classifier subject to the backdoor attack in [17]. Table VII
shows that, both benign and malicious classifiers keep good
prediction performance in clean test set. For the backdoor
test set, benign classifier keep the normal accuracy, while the
malicious classifier predicts inputs with the backdoor trigger
as the attacked label successfully.
We conduct sensitivity analysis by computing the coverage
of the proposed test metrics in training data (T), clean test data
(C), and backdoor test data (B) for each classifier. In the first
row of Table VII, we calculate the coverage of the training data
from same class. On the basis of this, we add clean test data or
backdoor test data for evaluation. If the coverage rate is further
increased in second and third row, the new internal patterns are
discovered. The experimental results describe that backdoor
input activate same internal behavior with clean input for a
benign classifier. In contrast to this, the backdoor input to
malicious classifier will induce different internal activation,
which can be seen from the apparent increase of coverage
in T+B. Although the backdoor input is very similar to the
clean input with a small region of pixels changed (Fig. 6), the
internal activation in the malicious model can still be revealed
by the coverage change of the proposed TESTRNN metrics.
We remark that the above experiment only confirms that
test metrics are sensitive to backdoor samples when testing
an attacked model. More accurate detection of backdoor in
RNNs needs more precise refinement of test metrics, e.g.
adding the backdoor knowledge to the metrics design on top of
the structure information. Nevertheless, the goal of coverage
guided testing is still diversifying the test suite so that defects
like backdoor samples are more likely to be detected.
Answer to RQ4: The TESTRNN metrics can identify
the difference between the backdoor input and the
normal input (to malicious models).
D. Effectiveness of Test Case Generation (RQ5)
We show the effectiveness of our test case generation
from the following aspects: (1) it is non-trivial to achieve
high coverage rate, and (2) there is a significant percentage
of adversarial samples in the generated test suite. For (1),
we show that the targeted mutation (i.e., random mutation
enhanced by genetic algorithm) is needed to boost the cov-
erage rate. Three test case generation methods are considered:
(Seeds) sampling 200 seeds input from training dataset, (Ran.)
generating test cases from seeds by using random mutation,
and (Targ.) generating test cases from seeds by using targeted
mutation. Fig. 6 demonstrates detected adversarial samples for
IMDB and Lipophilicity models, and we omit other models
for brevity. All experimental results are based on 5 runs
with different random seeds. The results are averaged and
summarised in Table VIII. For each test case generation
method and LSTM model, we also report the number of
adversarial samples, unique adversarial samples in the test
suite and their average perturbation. This experiment considers
all four models.
Fig. 6: Backdoor samples for MNIST model (left). Adversarial
samples for IMDB (middle) and Lipophilicity (right) models.
Table VIII shows that, the coverage rates and the number of
adversarial samples for Ran. are significantly higher than those
of Seeds, that is, Ran. is effective in finding the adversarial
samples around the original seeds. Furthermore, if we use
Targ., both the coverage rates and the number of adversarial
samples are further increased. The above observations confirm
the following two points: (1) our test metrics come with
a strong bug finding ability; and (2) higher coverage rates
indicate more comprehensive test. We remark that, the TC
rates for UCF101 model are relatively low and harder to
improve, because the mutations are made on the image frames
(i.e., before CNN layers) instead of directly on the LSTM
input. This shows that the adversarial samples for CNNs are
orthogonal to those of LSTMs, another evidence showing that
test metrics for CNNs cannot be directly applied to RNNs.
Answer to RQ5: The test case generation algorithm
is effective in improving both the coverage rate and
the adversary rate. In particular, the targeted mutation
method can be utilised to find more corner samples.
E. Comparison with Attack-based Defect Detection (RQ6)
We compare TESTRNN with state-of-the-art RNN adver-
sarial attack [31], [2], which detects robustness defects. These
attack algorithms utilise the model’s gradient over input se-
quence to iteratively change some parts of the input that
contribute the most to the model’s prediction. Their methods
TABLE VIII: Experiments for Test Case Generation Methods








Seeds 200 - - - 0.43 0.14 0.34
Ran. 10000 226 1.180 18 0.57 0.52 0.66
Targ. 10000 244 1.497 32 1.00 1.00 0.79
IMDB
Seeds 200 - - - 0.11 0.05 0.24
Ran. 10000 308 0.136 88 0.84 0.40 0.77
Targ. 10000 367 0.103 97 1.00 0.58 0.82
Lipophilicity
Seeds 200 - - - 0.65 0.55 0.48
Ran. 2000 812 - 190 0.95 1.00 0.91
Targ. 2000 834 - 194 1.00 1.00 0.95
UCF101
Seeds 200 - - - 0.52 0.53 0.11
Ran. 10000 3613 1.031 112 0.82 0.90 0.31
Targ. 10000 4201 1.251 156 1.00 1.00 0.66
can successfully find adversarial samples. However, these
attack methods have two main drawbacks, when compared
with our testing method.
First, attack methods search for adversarial samples by
adding perturbations in the gradient direction. This easily
leads to the situation where the generated adversarial samples
are concentrated in a “buggy” area of the input space, as
shown in Table X and Fig. 7. We first collect the same
amount of adversarial samples in MNIST model returned
by attack methods and TESTRNN, respectively. Then, we
calculate the angular-based diversity of each set (Table X)
and apply the Principal Component Analysis (PCA), a well
known dimensionality reduction technique, to project the high
dimensional adversarial images onto two dimensional space
for better visualisation (Fig. 7). We can see from the resulting
diversity measurement and visualisation that, compared to at-
tack methods, our testing method exercises different behaviors
of RNN and generates a diverse set of test cases, intensively
covering the input region around the seed input. This ability
will be helpful in exposing more types of defects of the RNN
(not merely in the gradient direction).
Moreover, RNNs are widely applied to the nature language
processing, in which the inputs to an RNN, i.e., words, are
discretely distributed. Attack methods aggressively replace im-
portant words in the text and produce an adversarial sequence.
In this process, it is hard to consider both the gradient and
the whole text’s semantic meaning. That is, the modified text
may easily become human-unreadable and impossible to occur
in real world. On the other hand, our testing method is able
to reduce such problems by taking the mutants from off-the-
shelf tools such as the EDA toolkit. Fig. 6 presents adversarial
movie reviews returned by attack method and TESTRNN,
respectively. It is easy to see that the adversarial review
returned by the gradient attack is hard to comprehend while
the one from TESTRNN is much easier.
Answer to RQ6: The TESTRNN is able to generate
a set of diverse and natural test cases, so as to expose
more types of defects.
F. Comparison with State-of-the-Art testing methods (RQ7)
We compare TESTRNN with DeepStellar, a state-of-the-
art testing tool dedicated for RNNs. As discussed in Section
V-0b, two different test metrics are integrated in DeepStel-
lar, i.e. state coverage and transition coverage, which are
corresponding to boundary coverage and step-wise coverage
in TESTRNN. Apart from these, TESTRNN have temporal
coverage for the internal sequential processing behaviour of
RNNs. We start from 100 seeds drawn from training set and
generate 100000 test cases by DeepStellar and TESTRNN,
respectively. The test suites are evaluated for the coverage rate
and number of adversarial samples. We compute basic state
coverage (BS), basic transition coverage (BT), and weighted
transition coverage (WT) in DeepStellar guided by different
generation strategy, S-Guide and T-Guide. The testing results
for both are recorded in Table IX. First, we can see that test
metrics in DeepStellar already have high coverage rates upon
seeds input, as opposed to our metrics which display relatively
smaller coverage rates upon the same seeds. That means that
our metrics are better for exploiting the input space around
seeds. Second, DeepStellar adopts the fuzzing strategy with
the guidance of different test metrics, which is effective to
boost the coverage. However, in this experiment for small-
scale model trained on MNIST, 100000 test cases are still not
enough for 100% coverage of test requirements in DeepStellar.
It seems that some of their defined test requirements may be
infeasible to satisfy. On the contrary, TESTRNN can achieve
a relatively high coverage results with random mutation and
the coverage rates of all the metrics can be significantly boost
to achieve 100% by genetic algorithm based mutation method.
The number of adversarial samples in the test suite reflects that
TESTRNN is superior to DeepStellar in terms of exploiting
diverse internal behaviors and bugs finding ability.
TABLE IX: Comparison between DeepStellar and TESTRNN
using MNIST: 100000 test cases are generated from 100 seeds
DeepStellar TestRNN
Test Metrics Seeds S-Guid. T-Guid. Test Metrics Seeds Ran. Targ.
BS 0.45 0.80 0.82 BC 0.14 0.57 1.00
BT 0.11 0.32 0.63 SC 0.38 0.67 1.00
WT 0.76 0.90 0.95 TC 0.24 0.70 1.00
Adv. Samples - 1588 1661 Adv. Samples - 1778 1830
TABLE X: Angular-based diversity (a greater value represents
a better diversity) and average perturbation (smaller is better)
of adversarial samples
Seed Angular-based Diversity Avg. Perturb.
TESTRNN DeepStellar Attack TESTRNN DeepStellar Attack
1 -0.277 -0.468 -0.598 0.006 0.012 0.014
2 -0.289 -0.438 -0.556 0.006 0.010 0.013
Fig. 7: Visualisation of adversarial samples generated by
TESTRNN, DeepStellar, and Gradient-based Attack, respec-
tively, in MNIST model. The visualisation is conducted by
projecting high-dimensional images onto a two-dimensional
space. Each figure corresponds to a seed input in the dataset.
To understand the relative merits of the defects returned by
DeepStellar, TESTRNN, and Gradient-based Attack, respec-
tively, we compute the angular-based diversity and average
perturbation of each set (Table X), and visualise them with
PCA projection (Fig. 7). We can see that the adversarial
samples from DeepStellar are sparsely distributed and most of
them are more distant to the seed input. TESTRNN explores
space that is close to the seed input. This aligns better to the
goal of adversarial testing, which is to find more bugs around
the seed with as small perturbations as possible (the bugs are
more realistic/natural, thus more likely to exist in real world).






BS BT WT BC SC TC
TestRNN Ran. - 0.78 0.63 0.94 0.57 0.67 0.70Targ. BC,SC,TC 0.78 0.64 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00
DeepStellar S-Guide. BS 0.80 0.32 0.90 0.05 0.10 0.12T-Guide. BT,WT 0.82 0.63 0.95 0.10 0.24 0.20
In addition to the comparison of testing results, we are also
interested in the complementarity of test metrics in TESTRNN
and DeepStellar. We derive the minimal test suites by different
test case generation methods. Then, the test suite generated
by TESTRNN is evaluated for the coverage of metrics in
DeepStellar, and vice versa. Results in Table XI suggests that
test suite generated by TESTRNN can easily achieve high
coverage rate for the metrics in DeepStellar. We find that, test
suite produced by DeepStellar cannot get high coverage rate
on our metrics. This confirms our discussion of the relation
between coverage metrics in Section V-0b.
Answer to RQ7: The TESTRNN test generation can
achieve high coverage of the test metrics in DeepStel-
lar, but not vice versa.
G. Exhibition of Internal Working Mechanism (RQ8)
In this section, we show that the working mechanism of
LSTM networks can be understood via the test cases generated
from TESTRNN. We conduct experiments to visualise the
learning process of LSTM layer via TESTRNN results.
Coverage times denote the number of times a test condition
is satisfied by running the test suite. Intuitively, coverage times
represent the level of difficulty of asserting an input feature.
Fig. 8 reports the coverage times for each input feature. We
note that, in BC and SC, each input feature xt corresponds to
a test condition on ξs,at , as in MNIST it is defined with respect
to a row of pixels on the input image. In sentiment analysis
model, the input feature refers to a word in movie reviews.
As discussed in Section IV, SC is to assert if an input feature
is significant to the model prediction. Then an important input
feature will cause great changes of hidden memory ht and
satisfy the test condition of SC. BC monitors the forget gate
values at each time step. The satisfaction of BC means the
LSTM will not drop out the information stored in memory.
If we combine SC and BC plots, the whole working process
of LSTM layer inside the MNIST model becomes transparent.
Fig. 8: 2000 test cases are used to demonstrate the coverage
times of 28 features in an LSTM layer of MNIST model
(first line) and 500 input features in LSTM layer of IMDB
Sentiment Analysis model (second line).
The sequential input of an image starts from the top row
and finishes at the bottom row. At the beginning, the top
rows of MNIST images are blank and do not contribute
to the model prediction. These less-important information is
gradually thrown away from the memory. When the input rows
containing digits are fed to the LSTM cells, the model will
start learning and the short term memory, represented by the
outputs ht, start to have strong reactions. When approaching
the end of the input, which corresponds to the bottom of
the digit images, LSTM has already been confident about the
final classification and therefore becomes lazy to update the
memory. Overall, we can see that, MNIST digits recognition
is not a complicated task for the LSTM model and usually the
top half of the images are sufficient for the classification.
For the IMDB model, the final classification is influenced by
every input feature. To make sure that input features between
450-500 contain real words instead of padded 0s, we take
2,000 reviews whose length are greater than 50. We observe
from the second line in Fig. 8 that the coverage times gradually
increase, it might be the nature of test cases – most test cases
contain text of length much less than 500. We therefore focus
on the last 50 input features. We see that, both BC and SC
test conditions in the IMDB model are randomly activated, a
phenomenon that is completely different from that of MNIST
results. This can be explained as that the IMDB model does not
have a fixed working pattern like the MNIST model. Sensitive
words in a review may appear in any place of the text.
Answer to RQ8: The generated test suite can be used
to understand the data processing mechanism of LSTM
models. This is a step towards interpretable RNNs.
H. Threats to Validity
First, we fix the thresholds or symbols of test metrics for
all the experiments. If we decrease the values of threshold (or
reduce the symbols to represent sub-ranges), the test conditions
can be easier to satisfy, and fewer test cases are generated.
Conversely, if we tighten the thresholds, more test cases are
needed to cover the test conditions. The input space are more
thoroughly explored.
Second, we only choose part of input sequence to test,
details of which is shown in Table II. If we use TESTRNN
to test the entire input sequence, some test conditions may
be harder to meet. The choices of partial input sequences in
our experiment are as follows. For MNIST dataset, the hand-
written digits are usually concentrated on 4th to 24th rows out
of 28 rows. The rest of the images are blank. For IMDB and
Lipophilicity dataset, the input to RNNs are usually padded
with 0s. And the input 0s only induce very small activation,
which can be seen in Fig. 8.
We define unique mutation functions for different models to
ensure the generated test input are always valid. Since we set
thresholds of test metrics with reference to the training data, it
is non-trivial to validate the test input. Mutation function needs
to keep the semantics meanings of seeds input. For example,
in the experiment of testing IMDB model, we mutate the text
paragraph instead of the input to LSTM layer.
Some minor threats include the settings of oracle and
random seeds. We also fix the configurations for these pa-
rameters to make all the experiments consistent. The oracle
radius can affect the adversarial samples rate and the average
perturbations in the test suite. If we set up a smaller oracle
radius, the number of perturbed input recognized as adversarial
samples and the average perturbations are both decreased. The
random seeds are utilized to control the reproducibility of the
experiments. In most experiments, we do several test with
different seeds input and get the average results so that the
accidental errors can be avoided.
VIII. RELATED WORK
a) Adversarial Samples for RNNs: Since adversarial
robustness is regarded as a major safety concern for deep
learning [21], a number of works appear on generating ad-
versarial samples for RNN tasks such as natural language
processing [31] , and automated speech recognition [14]. In
this paper, we treat adversarial samples as a proxy to evaluate
the effectiveness of the proposed coverage criteria.
b) Testing Feedforward Neural Networks: Most neural
network testing methods focus on FNNs. In [32] the neuron
coverage is proposed for exploiting neuron activation condi-
tions in an FNN. Various refinements and extensions of neuron
coverage are later developed in [25]. Motivated by the usage of
MC/DC coverage metrics in high criticality software, in [39],
a family of MC/DC variants are designed for FNNs, by taking
into account the causal relation between features of different
layers. Moreover, it has been shown in [39] that the criteria
in [32], [25] are special cases of the MC/DC variants.
In addition to the structural coverage criteria mentioned
above, metrics in [48], [7] define a set of test conditions to
partition the input space. Though not being a coverage metric,
the method in [22] measures the difference between training
and test datasets based on structural information of FNNs.
Guided by the coverage metrics, test cases can be generated
via various techniques including e.g., heuristic search [53],
fuzzing [30], [18], mutation [26], [45], and symbolic encoding
[40], [16], etc. None of these works have considered RNNs.
Please refer to [21] for a survey on techniques for the safety
and trustworthiness of neural networks.
c) Testing RNNs: Few works contribute to the devel-
opment of coverage metrics for RNNs. DeepStellar [12]
firstly proposes to abstract an RNN model into a Discrete-
Time Markov Chain (DTMC). The abstracted DTMC is an
approximation, whose fidelity to the original RNN is unknown.
Such approximation can lead to unexpected consequences for
testing, including the false positives and false negatives due to
the misplacement of faulty corner cases in RNN and DTMC.
Moreover, only cell states c are utilised in the abstracted
DTMC along with the development of test metrics. Other
functional components of RNNs, including the gates f, i, o and
the hidden output h, are not considered. As demonstrated in
experiments, these components have their dedicated meanings
and ought to be considered when a more extensive testing is
expected. They are also helpful to improve the interpretability
of testing results. Moreover, RNN-Test [19] develops some test
metrics to work with the structural components (gate f , cell c,
output h) directly. Their test metrics can be viewed as special
cases of our boundary coverage. More importantly, they do not
study the temporal relations, which we believe are the most
fundamental characteristics of RNNs (as opposed to CNNs).
We think that the differences mentioned above are significant
enough to distinguish the work of ours from that in [12] and
[19].
d) Difference between Testing and Defect Detection:
Recent paper [50] on correlations between coverage criteria
and model quality suggests that coverage guided testing com-
plements gradient-based adversarial attack. They discover that
adversarial samples found by FNN coverage guided testing
can be further utilised to retrain more robust models. However,
such models may not be robust to the gradient-based attack
(e.g. PGD [28]). On the other hand, PGD based adversarial
training may improve models’ robustness to the adversarial
attack but not attacks with guidance of coverage metrics.
e) Visualisation for LSTM: In each LSTM layer, a
sequential input {xt}nt=1 corresponds with a sequence of
vectors for structural components, e.g., {ft}nt=1 and {ht}nt=1.
These internal vectors are high dimensional and impossible
to be comprehended by humans. Then, some dimensionality
reduction methods (e.g. t-SNE and PCA) have been adopted
to visualise the information behind them. For instances, [34]
employs PCA to extract the principle component of ht at
each time step t. These methods facilitate the interpretation of
RNN’s hidden behaviours. Dimensionality reduction methods
have also been used to abstract a neural network into an
abstracted model such as a Bayesian network [3]. Our inter-
pretation is completely different from the above, and works
by visualising the working process of LSTM layer based on
a set of test cases.
f) Neural Network Repairing: The repairing of neural
network has also been studied, with the aim to utilise the
generated test cases to improve the model’s adversarial ro-
bustness [27], [52], [44] or fix the detected backdoor [43].
In contrast to the typical machine learning re-training [46],
such work often relies on properly designed test cases to first
identify certain structures inside the neural network model that
are responsible for the model’s undesirable behaviours, and
then correct the model’s behaviour by e.g., re-training [27],
weight adaption [52], symbolic constraint solving [43], etc.
In [44], each test case’s impact on improving the model
robustness is quantified. Nevertheless, we are not aware of
any repairing method that is designed for RNNs.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a coverage guided test framework
for the verification and validation of RNNs. We develop a
tool TESTRNN based on the test framework and validate it
on several LSTM models, trained on popular benchmarks. In
the future, we plan to investigate the possibility of utilising
the testing results to mitigate the RNN defects and also certify
RNNs.
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